Military identities, conventional capability and the politics of NATO standardisation at the beginning of the Second Cold War, 1970-1980 by Ford, Matthew & Gould, Alex
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
King’s Research Portal 
 
DOI:
10.1080/07075332.2018.1452776
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Ford, M., & Gould, A. (2019). Military identities, conventional capability and the politics of NATO standardisation
at the beginning of the Second Cold War, 1970-1980. INTERNATIONAL HISTORY REVIEW, 41(4), 775-792 .
https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2018.1452776
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 10. Jul. 2020
Matthew Ford Page 1 3/14/2018 
 
Military identities, conventional capability and the politics of NATO 
standardisation at the beginning of the Second Cold War, 1970-1980 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper uses equipment standardisation as a lens for examining power 
relationships and the importance of military identity in framing the development 
of NATO conventional capability. In the face of the Warsaw Pact’s overwhelming 
military capacity the logic of standardisation was compelling. Standardising 
equipment and making military forces interoperable reduced logistics overlap, 
increased the tempo of operations and allowed partners to optimise 
manufacturing capacity. Applied carefully, standardisation would help NATO 
mount a successful conventional defence of Western Europe, a crucial aspect of 
the Alliance’s flexible response strategy. In this paper we apply Actor Network 
Theory to standardisation discussions thereby revealing the incoherence and 
volatility of NATO’s collective strategic thinking and the vast networks of 
countervailing interests on which this is based.  
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Military identities, conventional capability and the politics of NATO 
standardisation at the beginning of the Second Cold War 
 
If the possession of nuclear weapons constitutes the high politics of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), then the standardisation of conventional 
equipment must surely represent the low politics of the Alliance’s Brussels-
based bureaucracy. During the 1950s and 60s discussions within NATO were 
concerned with balancing European and US security concerns as they related to 
extended nuclear deterrence and whether to rebuild West German military 
capacity.1  While Europeans wanted reassurance that the Americans were 
committed to using their nuclear arsenal in the face of Soviet aggression, the 
United States was keen to build a firebreak into their deterrence strategy. This 
involved upgrading European conventional forces in the hope that war could be 
limited to a conventional level and the rush to use nuclear weapons prevented.2 
Eventually known as Flexible Response, Europeans (especially the British and 
West Germans) felt that planning for a prolonged conventional war would 
undermine deterrence ‘by making it appear less likely that nuclear weapons 
would be used’.3 As long as Europeans focused their attention on the grand 
politics of nuclear deterrence, the challenge of producing interoperable 
conventional forces capable of holding back a Soviet invasion was of secondary 
importance. 
 
Following their withdrawal from Vietnam, however, the US military refocused its 
attention on what it decided was its core mission: the defeat of Warsaw Pact 
forces on the plains of West Germany. Eventually resulting in the 1980s doctrine 
of Air-Land Battle, the United States spent much of the 1970s identifying the 
                                                        
1 C. Bluth, "Reconciling the Irreconcilable: Alliance Politics and the Paradox of Extended 
Deterrence in the 1960s," Cold War History 1, no. 2 (2001); J. S. Corum, "Building a New 
Luftwaffe: The United States Air Force and Bundeswehr Planning for Rearmament, 1950-60," 
Journal of Strategic Studies 27, no. 1 (2004). S. Moody, "Enhancing Political Cohesion in Nato 
During the 1950s Or: How It Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the (Tactical) Bomb," 
ibid.39(2015). 
2 L. Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy  (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). pp. 
271-273. Kristina Spohr Readman, "Conflict and Cooperation in Intra-Alliance Nuclear Politics 
Western Europe, the United States, and the Genesis of Nato's Dual-Track Decision, 1977-1979," 
Journal of Cold War Studies 13, no. 2 (2011). S. Huntington, “Conventional Deterrence and 
Conventional Retaliation in Europe”, International Security, 8 no. 3 (1983-1984). 
3 Bluth, "Reconciling the Irreconcilable: Alliance Politics and the Paradox of Extended Deterrence 
in the 1960s." p. 94. For a fuller explanation of the different ways Flexible Response was 
interpreted see, B. Heuser, NATO, Britain, France and the FRG: Nuclear Strategies and Forces for 
Europe, 1949-2000 (London: Macmillan, 1997). 
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technological means that would allow their armed forces to defeat advancing 
Soviet armies even before they arrived at the forward edge of the battlefield.4 
With America’s senior commanders firmly fixed on the conventional defence of 
West Germany, the European powers of NATO subsequently found themselves 
under renewed pressure to upgrade their conventional forces. 5  This 
reinvigorated a process of equipment standardisation that had in many respects 
previously failed to deliver on the promises that politicians, defence planners 
and economists had suggested were possible over the previous thirty years.6 
 
Although most scholarly interest has concentrated on the management of the 
Alliance’s nuclear forces, this paper switches attention to the problem of creating 
conventional capability from the armed forces of 15 different nations at the start 
of the second Cold War. From the beginning of the alliance’s formation NATO 
powers understood the importance and benefits of interoperability and burden-
sharing for producing conventional armed forces that had a chance of standing 
up to the overwhelming numerical strength of the Soviet Union. Crucial to this 
project was the standardisation of policies, procedures, tactics and technology 
between Alliance partners. Without agreed protocols on everything from map 
symbology and communication procedures to the type of headphone jack or 
small arms (SA) and small arms ammunition (SAA) being used at the frontlines – 
particularly as it related to assault rifles and machine guns – NATO’s ability to 
defend itself with conventional forces would be severely curtailed. 
 
Invariably overlooked by those interested in military-technical change and 
alliance theory, this paper shows how mundane artefacts constructed and 
reflected power relations across NATO. NATO’s civilian and military bureaucrats 
established a procedural framework for producing standardisation agreements, 
known as STANAGs. STANAGs formed the basis through which interoperable 
forces could be established. Understandably dry and focused on the minutiae of 
                                                        
4 B. Lynn, The Echo of Battle - the Army's Way of War  (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University 
Press, 2007). pp. 173-233. 
5 In 1978, NATO approved the Long-term defence program, which provided additional impetus 
to the upgrading of conventional forces in Europe. A final communiqué of a meeting of NATO’s 
Defence Planning Committee in 1978 specifically highlighted the significance of efforts to 
‘improve the standardization and/or inter-operability of defence equipment’. See Final 
communiqué, Defence Planning Committee, 1978, Item 12, NATO On-line library, accessible at 
https://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c780518a.htm, accessed 27.2.2018 
6 Keith Hartley, "Nato, Standardisation and Nationalism: An Economist's View," RUSI: Royal 
United Services Institute for Defence Studies, Journal 123, no. 3 (1978). 
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definitions and technical specification, these agreements represent an insight 
into NATO thinking along a number of dimensions: from the place of the infantry 
in the defence of Western Europe, to defence industrial policy.  
 
Whereas most discussions of alliance relationships tend to focus on IR theory or 
Political Economy as a vehicle for exploring member state behaviours, the 
approach adopted here draws on science and technology studies. 7 
Standardisation agreements between NATO partners offer a rich location for 
charting the values of those actors, values that define acceptable and 
unacceptable socio-technical practices.8 By tracing the socio-technical bargains 
that underlie STANAGs it becomes possible to learn something about the 
mechanics of power within the Alliance. To make this fully transparent this 
paper draws on Actor Network Theory (ANT), particularly the work of Bruno 
Latour,9 and applies it to the emergence of new SA and SAA STANAGs in the 
1970s. ANT collapses material and social variables into one register, laying bare 
the networks of power that framed the arrival of new SA and SAA STANAGS. As a 
consequence, ANT helps identify how resistance can work in ways that 
undermine established dominant networks, a perspective that is particularly 
useful when discussing changing patterns of relations between NATO powers in 
the 1970s and early 1980s. 
 
This analysis also has the virtue of avoiding the trap of assessing technology 
change in reference to a technical end point. Instead, this paper reminds us that 
there is no such thing as a neutral technological goal but rather that the process 
                                                        
7 On IR Theory see, A. Thompson, "Coercion through Ios: The Security Council and the Logic of 
Information Transmission," International Organization 60, no. 1 (2006); D. Bearce and S. 
Bondanella, "Intergovernmental Organizations, Socialization, and Member-State Interest 
Convergence," ibid.61, no. 4 (2007). With regards to political economy see, for example, the work 
by Professor Ethan Kapstein, a specialist in political economy, who has written about the 
contemporary distribution of power within NATO through the lens of military R&D. See E. B. 
Kapstein, "Allies and Armaments," Survival 44, no. 2 (2002); "International Collaboration in 
Armaments Production: A Second Best Solution," Political Science Quarterly 106, no. 4 (1991-92). 
Hartley, "Nato, Standardisation and Nationalism: An Economist's View; "Defence Industrial Policy 
in a Military Alliance," Journal of Peace Research 43, no. 4 (2006). 
8 The issue is examined in a number of non-military papers in the edited volume, D.L. Kleinman 
and K. Moore, eds., Routledge Handbook of Science, Technology and Society (London: Routledge, 
2014). 
9 B. Latour, "Where Are the Missing Masses? The Sociology of a Few Mundane Artefacts," in 
Shaping Technology/Building Society: Studies in Sociotechnical Change, ed. W. E. Bijker and J. Law 
(Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1992). 
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by which technical priorities are established is itself a social and political one.10 
With this in mind, it would be inaccurate to characterise standardisation as the 
technical ideal, and all deviation from it as patterned by social factors. In NATO’s 
own sociotechnical web, standardisation was not value-free but rather it was a 
means by which an Alliance partner or network could establish hegemonic 
control through the imposition of political and strategic cohesion. At the same 
time, small arms are foundational to the military-cultural identities of those who 
use them. It has often been acknowledged, for example, that rifles’ technical and 
aesthetic qualities bear the cultural hallmarks of their developers. The AK-47’s 
ergonomics and ease of use were representative of the values of socialism and 
collectivism.11 Bearing this in mind, it is an open question as to how small arms 
as sources of military identity affected standardisation in NATO. 
 
This paper shows that despite the NATO-wide imperative to standardise small 
arms and ammunition none of the dominant actors in NATO were willing to 
compromise on socio-technical priorities, often hinging on range and lethality. 
Countries were determined to ensure that standardisation occurred on terms 
favourable to them; this meant designing their own weapon system and 
attempting to persuade other NATO members that their solution was best. Thus, 
while the United States had an established 5.56mm round and M16 rifle that they 
had used in Vietnam, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) was designing a 
caseless 4.7mm round and G11 rifle that would reduce the weight of equipment 
carried by soldiers by as much as 20%. Meanwhile the British were developing 
their own small calibre 4.85mm round and service rifle to fire it. All three powers 
recognised that small arms standardisation was a means by which political goals 
could be advanced and national preferences maintained. 
 
This paper will focus primarily on the patterns of thought and interactions 
between the three dominant NATO actors who were proposing their own 
technical solutions - the United States, the FRG and the United Kingdom - as they 
geared up to trial new ammunition and weapons in the late 1970s. Despite the 
weight of research and development invested in a future round by the ‘big three’, 
                                                        
10 This is reflected in the work of D. Bloor, "Sociology of Scientific Knowledge," in Handbook of 
Epistemology, ed. I. Niiniluoto, I. Sintonen, and M. Wolenski (Netherlands: Springer, 2004); 
"Idealism and the Sociology of Knowledge," Social Studies of Science 26, no. 4 (1996).  
11 C. J. Chivers, The Gun  (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011). 
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the paper will finish by introducing the Belgian arms manufacturer – Fabrique 
Nationale (FN) – that succeeded in advancing its own ammunition as standard 
over and above the others.  
 
After introducing Actor Network theory and outlining the standardisation 
agenda in NATO, this article will examine the construction of social-technical 
preferences in small arms systems in each of NATO’s major defence producers, 
before discussing the broader, oppositional socio-technical network in which 
small arms standardisation became embedded over the course of the Cold War. 
The resulting analysis offers insights into the vast networks of countervailing 
interests that guide military technological development and presents an 
alternative interpretation of NATO politics and conventional military 
effectiveness beyond a focus on nuclear deterrence. 
 
 
Actor Network Theory 
Actor Network Theory (ANT) helps us to navigate our way through the various 
complex sociological forces that shaped and framed the standardisation debates 
in the 1970s. Emerging out of the work of Bruno Latour and Michel Callon, ANT 
is now a mainstream mode of inquiry in the sociology of technology.12 Varying in 
empirical and theoretical content, there is a rich literature that has applied ANT 
to everything from experimentation in biometric testing of refugees to how 
Britain might relinquish nuclear weapons.13 To date, however, ANT has not been 
applied to military-industrial matters within NATO.  
 
In contrast with the work of those approaches that draw on IR Theory or 
Political Economy, an investigation derived from ANT does not take economic, 
social or political interests as fixed. Instead, ANT sets out to develop a 
                                                        
12 M. Callon and B. Latour, "Unscrewing the Big Leviathan: How Actors Macro-Structure Reality 
and How Sociologists Help Them to Do So," in Advances in Social Theory and Methodology - 
Towards an Integration of Micro- and Macro-Sociologies, ed. K. Knorr-Cetina and A.V. Cicourel 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981); M. Callon, "The Sociology of an Actor Network: The 
Case of the Electric Vehicle," in Mapping the Dynamics of Science and Technology, ed. M. Callon, J. 
Law, and A. Rip (London: Macmillan, 1986). 
13 K. L. Jacobsen, "Experimentation in Humanitarian Locations: Unhcr and Biometric Registration 
of Afghan Refugees," Security Dialogue 46, no. 1 (2015); N. Ritchie, "Relinquishing Nuclear 
Weapons: Identities, Networks and the British Bomb," International Affairs 86, no. 2 (2010). For a 
more rounded perspective on how ANT can be applied in the field of International Relations, see 
A. Barry, “The Translation Zone: Between Actor-Network Theory and International Relations”, 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies 41, no. 3 (2013). 
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sociological analysis that lays bare the process by which these interests emerge. 
Callon and Latour do this by identifying how individual micro-actors are enrolled 
into a single collective will. Their goal is to explain the translation process these 
micro-actors use to agree the perspectives of others in such a way as to 
transform themselves, Leviathan-like, into legitimate macro-actors who can 
dictate socio-technical outcomes.14 These macro-actors then pass off these 
interests as established and pre-determined when in practice they are micro-
reifications of the perspectives of a collection of actors who have been enrolled 
into their network.15 
 
Recognising that durable, or material, considerations play a part in shaping the 
emergence of the macro-actor, ANT eschewed deterministic analyses that 
implied a difference between the social and the technological.16 Instead, Latour 
and Callon asked sociologists to identify how actors went about creating 
associations between the material and the social to form networks of power.17 
Aware that these networks were constantly in flux, being built and re-aligned as 
actors became enrolled in the maintenance of a socio-technical system, ANT 
offers a vehicle for exploring how rival networks emerge and resist macro-
actors. Thus Actor Network Theory asks scholars to engage with socio-technical 
change in ways that can help explore the balance of forces enrolled in producing 
particular sets of power relations at any one point in time. 
 
The key to a research programme that embraces ANT is to be attentive to how 
actors are enrolled into these wider networks. Specifically, it asks us to describe 
how alliances between actors emerge through a number of strategies that in 
effect shape, fix and secure the concerns of micro-actors into macro-networks. 
For Callon these strategies amount to a process of translation such that actors 
find ways to work together to resolve particular problems. The starting place for 
this involves one actor problematising a particular issue and setting themselves 
up as the focal point for defining potential solutions to that scenario. This central 
                                                        
14 Callon and Latour, "Unscrewing the Big Leviathan: How Actors Macro-Structure Reality and 
How Sociologists Help Them to Do So." 
15 M. Callon and J. Law, "On Interests and Their Transformation: Enrolment and Counter-
Enrolment," Social Studies of Science 12, no. 4 (1982). 
16 Callon, "The Sociology of an Actor Network: The Case of the Electric Vehicle." 
17 "Some Elements of a Sociology of Translation: Domestication of the Scallops and the Fisherman 
of St. Brieuc Bay," in Power, Action and Belief, ed. J. Law (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1986). 
 Matthew Ford Page 8 3/14/2018 
actor seeks to show how they are indispensible to other actors who agree with 
their characterisation of the problem. Having done this the central actor 
attempts to convince others that the solutions that they have identified ought to 
constitute the obligatory passage point through which everyone must pass. 
Assuming the micro-actors can be persuaded or enrolled into this network then 
the focal actor puts in place various methods for ensuring that the network 
complies with the agreements that have been reached. 
 
As will become apparent, given the way in which the debates on SA and SAA 
unfolded during the 1970s, ANT offers a useful lens through which we can 
develop more insightful analyses of NATO’s politics of standardisation. Our 
starting place involves exploring the problem of standardisation as it was 
understood in the 1970s. By examining military, engineering, industrial and 
material actors in the UK, US and the FRG we can then lay bare the strategies 
employed to produce socio-technical agreement on future SA/SAA 
standardisation. This approach also ensures that we can properly identify the 
way networks of resistance were mobilised through competing actor networks. 
 
 
The politics of NATO standardisation in the 1970s  
 
The need to standardise equipment, weapons and doctrine in NATO was 
recognised as a strategic imperative from the onset of the Cold War. As Eliot 
Cohen noted in an article in Foreign Policy in 1978, ‘non-standardised armies 
require unique and separate supply lines, making wide-ranging manoeuvres 
difficult… such armies must stock different types of spare parts: their logistics 
are therefore complicated and the number of support troops they require is 
wastefully large’ and that furthermore ‘neighbouring troops of different 
nationalities cannot supply each other with spare parts’.18 A letter written to the 
British leader of delegation to the North Atlantic Assembly in 1979, likewise, 
asserted that Rationalisation, Standardisation and Interoperability (RSI) was a 
‘route to more coherent alliance defence’,19 while senior British civil servants at 
                                                        
18 E. Cohen, "Nato Standardization: The Perils of Common Sense," Foreign Affairs, no. 31 (1978)., 
p. 75 
19  B.M. Webster (Head of IP2), Draft Letter to Patrick Wall, 1978, DEFE 13/1167 – 
Interoperability and Standardisation of Equipment in NATO (1978/1979), The National Archives, 
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the MOD also acknowledged that interoperability would provide substantial 
‘logistic advantage’.20 As a House of Commons Report noted, the lack of 
standardisation in NATO was in stark contrast to Warsaw Pact forces, which [in 
1977] enjoyed total ‘uniformity of doctrine, training, and equipment’.21 Indeed, a 
report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in 1979 
argued that increasing standardisation and interoperability were the only 
mechanism by which the ‘conventional force balance’ between NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact could be maintained.22 
 
Key to materiel RSI was the achievement of universal or compatible tactical 
concepts within NATO armies. If tactical preferences could be harmonised across 
the Alliance, then one user requirement could be produced and a weapon system 
developed to satisfy this specification. This implied that the use of ‘common or 
compatible tactical doctrine with corresponding organisation compatibility’ was 
a significant aspect of the overall rationalisation of NATO defence.23 Thus, a 
memo written to Britain’s Minister of State for Defence in 1978 noted that ‘the 
first step [of RSI] is to rationalise tactical concepts with other nations, because 
without such rationalisation there can be little prospect of agreement on weapon 
characteristics, or subsequently on weapon design or production’.24 In response 
to this growing demand to harmonise tactics, NATO’s Conference of National 
Armaments Directors was charged with identifying ‘common [operational] 
requirements and coordinate efforts to achieve cooperation’.25  
 
However, there was also a strong economic case for RSI in NATO. As was 
asserted in a CSIS newsletter concerning missile systems, ‘money can be spent 
wastefully developing eight different missiles, which can then only be procured 
in small quantities at high unit cost. Or it can be spent efficiently developing one 
                                                                                                                                                              
Kew. This collection includes many of the documents pertaining to the British dimension of 
NATO SA standardisation during a crucial two-year period between 1977 and 1979.  
20 VHB Macklen, DUS (P), 20 January 1978, DEFE 13/1167 – Interoperability and Standardisation 
of Equipment in NATO (1978/1979). 
21 Official Report, House of Commons, Vol. 926, Col 540/41 – 22/2/77 (Written), DEFE 13/1167 – 
Interoperability and Standardisation of Equipment in NATO (1978/1979) 
22 Transatlantic Policy Panel, ‘Allied Interdependence Newsletter’, The Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, No. 9 (March 1979), DEFE 13/1167 – Interoperability and Standardisation 
of Equipment in NATO (1978/1979). 
23 Ibid. pp. 3-7. 
24 Loose Minute, Minister of State’s Office, 13 February 1978, DEFE 13/1167 – Interoperability 
and Standardisation of Equipment in NATO (1978/1979) 
25  DUS (POL) PE/90/8/2/12, Minister of State, DEFE 13/1167 – Interoperability and 
Standardisation of Equipment in NATO (1978/1979) 
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standardised missile, which can then be bought in large quantities at low unit 
cost’.26 In 1976, one American commentator estimated that duplicative R&D and 
logistics systems and inefficient production cost NATO around $10bn annually, 
while some commanders gave a figure of $15bn;27 more than this, however, 
attaining standardisation was seen as essential to maximising the production 
and R&D potential of NATO’s European members.  
 
From an early stage, however, efforts to achieve standardisation and 
interoperability were stymied for a variety of reasons. According to British civil 
servant, Michael Quinlan, NATO Basic Military Requirements (which set out 
doctrinal guidelines for RSI) were both ‘unrealistic and inflexible’.28 Other MOD 
personnel cited the unwillingness of the US Armed Forces to change their tactical 
doctrines to fit in with those of European NATO members as a significant barrier 
to armaments cooperation. By contrast, some thought that the only real 
prospects for RSI lay in cooperation initiatives between two or three NATO 
member states, where there could be reasonable expectations of doctrinal 
homogeneity.29  
 
Although there was also disagreement between NATO member states on the 
industrial implications of small arms RSI, the most significant points of conflict 
(at least on the surface) concerned the lethality, range and weight of the new 
small arms system. The remainder of this article will highlight how debates over 
the ostensibly mundane technical details in small arms RSI illustrated not only 
the diversity and volatility of strategic interests within the alliance, but also the 
longstanding layering of technological development (in an alliance-wide 
network) between national identity and the broader economic considerations of 
materiel standardisation. This analysis will be divided into two sections. As first 
                                                        
26 Transatlantic Policy Panel, ‘Allied Interdependence Newsletter’, The Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, No. 9 (March 1979), DEFE 13/1167 – Interoperability and Standardisation 
of Equipment in NATO (1978/1979). 
27 For the $10bn figure see Dan Daniel, NATO Standardisation, Interoperability and Readiness: 
Report of the Special Subcommitte on NATO RSI of the Committee on Armed Services House of 
Representative with Additional Views, 95th Congress, Second Session, p. 13, DEFE 13/1167 – 
Interoperability and Standardisation of Equipment in NATO (1978/1979). For the $15bn see 
Committee of Armed Services, United States Senate, ‘Report on Authorising Appropriations for 
Fiscal Year 1977’, Ezell Gun Collection. 
28 Memo written by M.E. Quinlan, 16 January 1978, DEFE 13/1167 – Interoperability and 
Standardisation of Equipment in NATO (1978/1979) 
29  DUS (POL) PE/90/8/2/12, Minister of State, DEFE 13/1167 – Interoperability and 
Standardisation of Equipment in NATO (1978/1979). 
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point of inquiry, it will analyse the construction of technical priorities within 
each of the three most influential voices on small arms development in NATO – 
the US, UK and Germany. Subsequently, it will investigate how these differences, 
while not intractable, had become integrated into relational networks between 
the powers that made achieving a consensus on one of their preferred options all 
but impossible. Ultimately, it was only the Belgian arms manufacturer FN FAL 
that was able to achieve a degree of compromise within the network.  
 
 
The United States 
America was the arsenal of democracy during the Second World War and to a 
large degree, remained primus inter pares within NATO during the Cold War. 
Structural and material advantages might have suggested that the United States 
would become the central actor around which a socio-technical network might 
emerge. However, it did not follow that the rest of NATO would accept the US 
position on standardisation. 
 
The US small arms establishment had itself been racked by disagreements over 
rifle development, which had industrial, financial, political and reputational 
ramifications. The selection of the M16 in 1964 had, for example, been 
controversial for a number of reasons. Known as the black rifle, because it was 
acquired outside the usual procurement process, the M16 was initially ignored in 
senior circles within the US Army because they favoured the M-14.30 Adopted in 
1957, the M-14 represented a bargain between the US Army Ordnance Corps, the 
Army’s traditional advisors on equipment selection, and those senior officers 
that remained wedded to the kinds of marksmanship traditions that were 
embodied by the Springfield Rifle and latterly the M-1 Garand from the First and 
Second World Wars.31 
 
It was this tradition of marksmanship that linked technological development and 
the intangibles of military and national identity in US small arms development. 
Marksmanship emphasised the ability of soldiers to strike targets at ranges 
                                                        
30B. R. Stevens and E. Ezell, The Black Rifle: M16 Retrospective  (Cobourg, Ontario: Collector Grade 
Publications, 1992). 
31 T. McNaugher, The M16 Controversies – Military Organisations and Weapons Acquisition  (New 
York: Praeger, 1984). 
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between 600m and 900m, and the engineering solutions that had been 
developed to realise this objective meant designing a weapon that could fire 
large .30’06 calibre ammunition. The .30’06 round had in turn formed the basis 
for 7.62mm ammunition, which NATO adopted in 1957 and was used in the M-
14. Committed to this calibre, US officers flatly refused to consider alternatives 
during SAA standardisation debates in the 1950s stating that any standardised 
round ‘must have the wounding power, penetration performance and ballistics 
at least equal to that in use today’.32  
 
Transferring institutional allegiance from older rifles to the M16 nevertheless 
demanded the production of new myths if the US Army was going to embrace 
another weapon and survive the inevitable criticism that would come about from 
changing equipment so quickly after adopting the 7.62mm round and the M-14. 
In this respect, for those who believed the Ordnance Corps had been betrayed 
and the professional shooting ideals of the infantry undermined, the M16 was a 
Mattel weapon. But for those who wanted to keep the infantry relevant in a 
future dominated by nuclear weapons, the switch was about increasing the 
lethality of the infantry. 
 
Initially used in Vietnam, the logic of lethality as a founding myth worked 
spectacularly well all the while reports about the M16 emphasised the dramatic 
effects of 5.56mm ammunition on enemy combatants.33 These reports were, 
however, sustained by an active marketing campaign engineered by Eugene 
Stoner, the lead designer of the M16, and Colt Industries, the new owner of the 
production license after ArmaLite sold its rights to the weapon. According to 
Stoner and Colt the tumbling action of the purpose-built 5.56mm ammunition 
demonstrated that the M16 was ‘the most lethal rifle the world had known’.34 
This was backed by US Department of Defense analysis known as Project AGILE 
in August 1962. According to C.J. Chivers the analysis was conducted along 
scientifically dubious grounds in order to support the case for the M16’s 
introduction. 35  Nevertheless, the final Project AGILE report laid out the 
wounding power of the new 5.56mm round in all its gory detail; ‘back wound, 
                                                        
32 E. Ezell, The Great Rifle Controversy: Search for the Ultimate Infantry Weapon from World War 2 
through Vietnam and Beyond  (Harrisburg, Pa.: Harrisburg 1984)., pp. 92-93. 
33 Chivers, The Gun., p. 282. 
34 Ibid., p. 283. 
35 Ibid., p. 276. 
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which caused the thoracic cavity to explode’, ‘buttock wound, which destroyed 
all of the tissue of both buttocks’, ‘heel wound, the projectile entered the bottom 
of the right foot causing the leg to split from the foot to the hip’.36 Whether 
5.56mm ammunition was an effective round was almost irrelevant. For those 
trying to engineer new loyalties to the M16, the ambitions were simple. If the 
Infantry were to remain relevant then they had to embrace modern weapons. 
 
Creating a sense of loyalty to the M16 was no doubt made harder by the way it 
suffered catastrophic failures in the mid-1960s while in action with American GIs 
in Vietnam. Initially put down to GI’s poor cleaning regimes, the M16 
subsequently underwent several separate investigations (by the Army, DoD, Colt 
and Congress) all of which had the effect of passing the blame between agencies. 
Conveniently for the supporters of the M16, however, the Ordnance Corps could 
be blamed for changing the type of propellant contained in the 5.56mm SAA that 
culminated in the weapon’s failure in Vietnam. With the Ordnance Corps 
discredited it became increasingly hard for those who wanted to retain the M-14 
– and the traditions of marksmanship it implied – to sustain their position. 
 
Nevertheless, switching to the M16 clearly undermined the stated US foreign 
policy goals of standardisation within NATO. By 1976 these had been embedded 
into various pieces of legislation such as the Culver-Nunn amendment to the 
Department of Defense Appropriation Authorisation Act. Once called the ‘most 
authoritative statement of policy by any NATO ally regarding standardisation 
and interoperability’, this stated that all equipment procured for Europe-based 
US personnel ‘should be standardised or at least interoperable with equipment 
of other members of NATO’, and that ‘the Secretary of Defense shall, to the 
maximum feasible extent initiate and carry out procurement procedures that 
provide for the acquisition of equipment which is standardised or 
interoperable’.37 
 
Although the US had signed a 1976 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with 
other NATO powers agreeing to hold and abide by trials that would determine a 
future standardised SAA round, the potential economic implications of adopting 
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a calibre other than 5.56mm remained unwelcome. Unlike many of NATO’s 
European member states, the US Army had staked a great deal of its reputation 
in the M16 and saw no benefit from switching to another system especially 
when, according to Edward Ezell, the cost of doing so might amount to around 
$360m.38 Given their commitment to 5.56mm SAA the Americans were therefore 
very keen to find ways to persuade their European allies that they too should 
adopt the new US ammunition as a standard. Having committed so much 
political, financial and social capital to the procurement of the M16 switching to 
an alternative weapon system would be extremely painful for American 
policymakers. Notwithstanding the humiliation of discarding a service rifle so 
soon after adopting it, the M16 represented a historic (though evolving) tradition 
of American soldiering. More than being a technical solution to the US’s 
individual warfighting needs, its preferences on range and lethality were socially 
constructed over a long period. The next part of this article will explore the 
socio-technical priorities of the Federal Republic of Germany and the United 
Kingdom.  
 
 
The Federal Republic of Germany 
The Bundeswehr had very much bought into the RSI benefits of adopting the 
7.62mm cartridge when it adopted the FN FAL (designated the G1 rifle) in 1956. 
However, after the standardisation trials of 1979-80, trials that had been brought 
about by the signing of the 1976 MOU, the FRG was the only major arms 
producer in the Alliance to reject RSI in favour of their own prototype weapon 
and ammunition. Instead of adopting the American 5.56mm round, the FRG 
decided to hold off making changes in the hope that they could re-equip with the 
far lighter, caseless 4.7mm G11 rifle. At prototype stage by the time of the trials, 
the FRG hoped it would be ready for combat service at some point in the late 
1980s. The G11, designed and developed by a consortium of German 
manufacturers that included Heckler and Koch, was built around experimental 
and potentially revolutionary ammunition. Without a brass cartridge case, the 
4.7mm round significantly reduced soldier burden and had the potential to 
revolutionise the tactical engagement. Unfortunately, the weapon suffered a 
                                                        
38 Ezell, The Great Rifle Controversy: Search for the Ultimate Infantry Weapon from World War 2 
through Vietnam and Beyond., p. 270.  
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number of faults during the trials and was withdrawn prematurely. Given that 
the FRG had signed the 1976 MOU on SA/SAA standardisation, however, the 
Bundeswehr’s decision not to adopt the eventual winner of the trials demands 
some exploration.  
 
Within a few short years of adopting the 7.62mm NATO round, opinion in the 
Bundeswehr had turned fairly decisively against this cartridge in favour of 
smaller and lighter weapons and ammunition. At a meeting in February 1967, 
FRG officers stated that they believed the ‘main weakness of modern weapons 
was over-powerful ammunition’, and that the FRG would be better served by a 
smaller, lighter weapon chambered for a cartridge of between 4.5 and 4.8mm in 
size. 39 
 
This reflected the Bundeswehr’s thinking on mechanised infantry; specifically, a 
view that Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFV) should be able to fight en route to an 
objective, and that infantry should be able to engage the enemy from within their 
armoured vehicles.40 The origins of this type of armoured vehicle can be traced 
back to the Second World War, and in many respects reflect Germany’s unique 
battlefield environment.41 20% of the FRG’s population and 16% of its industry 
were located in a small, 50km-wide strip of land on its Eastern border. 30% of 
the country’s land was forested, and most importantly, exposure lines (straight 
lines in terrain permitting unobstructed view) were restricted to under 600m 
across 70% of the country’s area.42 With their greater mobility, mechanised 
infantry units possessed a flexible combat capability, which could fight its way on 
to the objective. Recognising the complexity of the forested terrain and restricted 
exposure lines, the FRG IFV – known as the Marder – was designed with a 
7.62mm coaxial machinegun on the top but featured fire-ports for the infantry 
squad to shoot from while they were inside it.43 
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In order to further optimise mechanised infantry, the Bundeswehr were on the 
lookout for a service weapon that would allow them to operate more effectively 
from the Marder. Envisaging a weapon that ‘could replace both rifles and sub-
machine guns, and possibly pistols in as well’ German officers noted that the 
Rheinmetall G3 rifle which (following disputes with Fabrique Nationale) replaced 
the G1 in 1959 was no longer acceptable.44 The G3 was too long and too heavy to 
allow infantry to use their weapon while inside the Marder and was not suitable 
for urban, forested and close range environments characteristic of the FRG 
battlespace. As a result, by 1969 one British officer observed that the 
Bundeswehr, ‘are already replacing G3 rifles with SMGs [sub-machine guns] in 
some of their mechanised infantry battalions’.45  
 
This imperative intensified during the 1970s, when the Soviet Union drastically 
strengthened its mechanised infantry capability. In 1973, the Red Army 
introduced a new armoured personnel carrier and infantry combat vehicle which 
‘greatly increased the mobility, flexibility and fire power of infantry units’ and 
increased the manpower of motor rifle divisions by around 20%.46 As English 
accounts in On Infantry, ‘whereas the ratio of tank to motor rifle divisions in the 
Red Army was 1:1.8 in the early 1960s, it had been reduced to 1:2.2 by 1974’.47 If 
the Red Army hoped to execute a rapid general move forward to pin NATO forces 
the FRG’s mechanised infantry units would be crucial to slowing down and 
helping to repel an incursion.48 
 
Herein lay the attractiveness of a prototype G11 rifle which was over 10 inches 
shorter than the M16, and had ammunition weighing around half as much as the 
American 5.56mm brass-cased round. The FRG, unlike the British and 
Americans, had long placed more emphasis on the hit probability benefits of 
lighter, smaller calibres than the additional range and lethality of full-power rifle 
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cartridges. In 1969 the Bundeswehr believed ‘hit probability was, within 
reasonable limits, more important than lethality’.49 If riflemen were ‘not very 
effective at hitting targets beyond about 300m’, FRG officers argued that a ‘low-
performance, light, small-calibre weapon should enable quick and accurate 
aiming’.50 A Bundeswehr study from the late 1960s had found that although 
German soldiers scored only 10% hits against man-sized targets at normal battle 
ranges, around 40% of shots fired were within a ‘10cm periphery’ of the 
targets.51 Under these circumstances a salvo capability would be more effective 
than precision fire.52 With its small size, lightweight, unique burst fire capability 
and caseless 4.7mm cartridge, the G11 system was intended to compensate for 
poor soldier shooting performance and offer more operational flexibility in the 
face of what was presumed to be an overwhelming Warsaw Pact capability. 
Finding ways to enrol the Germans into a network that supported 5.56mm SAA 
would, therefore have to overcome the Bundeswehr’s increasingly fixed 
perspective on the tactical utility of the Marder and the G11 rifle.  
 
 
The United Kingdom 
While the United States were investing heavily in 5.56mm ammunition and the 
M16, Britain’s design capability had been put into full decline after the decision 
to abandon their own experimental rifle, known as the EM2, in 1953. Since the 
1940s British engineers had established that the full-power SAA in service at the 
time was ill suited to the realities of modern combat. The ammunition meant 
weapons had to be built that were too heavy and cumbersome for the relatively 
short ranges at which the majority of infantry engagements took place. Given 
that a Labour government had actually declared in 1951 that it would adopt the 
EM2 as the Rifle No.9 Mk1 a considerable amount of political capital had been 
invested in the future small arms that the British Army would use. In many 
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respects this continued to overshadow much of the decision-making associated 
with small arms even up to the 1970s and beyond. 
 
Following the decision to abandon the EM2, however, British opinion turned 
fairly decisively against the potential standardisation of a small calibre cartridge. 
Despite previous support for smaller, high-velocity ammunition, the US adoption 
of the 5.56mm and its new M16 rifles heralded a period of intense concern in the 
British military establishment. In April 1969, Lieutenant General George Lea, 
Britain’s Defence Attaché in Washington DC stated that ‘an early move to 
5.56mm by the US would undoubtedly have serious repercussions for us’.53  
 
Although it was noted that ‘it is technically possible to improve the performance 
of the present US 5.56mm cartridge’ there was little interest in pursuing such a 
solution within the British Army and switching away from existing 7.62mm 
weapons.54 In practice, in the late 1960s the benefits of switching to 5.56mm SAA 
was uncertain – especially as the Americans had been investigating new 
ammunition types as part of a project known as SALVO. The potential then to 
adopt 5.56mm just as the Americans switched to a new calibre was therefore a 
significant institutional break in the mind of Britain’s military-bureaucratic 
decision makers. In this respect, the British opposition to 5.56mm carries all the 
hallmarks of an embedded technical preference, where a previous decision forms 
the backdrop for years of technological decision-making.  
 
In 1979, however, the UK submitted an even smaller round (the 4.85x49mm) to 
the NATO trials. Rather than reflecting a resurgent desire to standardise SAA, 
these decisions resulted more from the technical imperatives arising out of 
operations in Northern Ireland. The beginning of the Troubles in 1969 and 
coincident civil disobedience in the United States prompted a period of intense 
re-examination of equipment and tactical doctrine in the British Armed Forces. 
As one MOD paper, published in 1970, put it, 
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The situation in Northern Ireland and examples of internal unrest in the 
United States are pointers to the changing nature of civil disturbance to 
which the British Army must adapt. Crowds may consist of determined 
rioters over 5,000 strong who may not be easily dispersed. Women and 
children may be placed in the forefront of crowds. Troops may be fired on by 
snipers or grenaded/fire bombed as they attempt to disperse crowds. 
Crowds may be manipulated by terrorists to draw troops into ambushes. 
Propaganda and rumour spreading will be used by the terrorists to discredit 
the military forces. In the UK in particular, the distorting effects of the mass 
media will be exploited to the full and claims of brutality and of the use of 
excessive force will be used to inhibit the actions of the security forces.55 
 
In essence, the paper asserted that the ‘changing nature of civil disturbance’ 
inside the UK’s borders necessitated innovative new tactical and technological 
approaches to warfighting. This was buttressed by the view that inappropriate 
US tactics and doctrine had been a major contributor to the Kent State Shootings 
that year, and that the British Army should take whatever steps were necessary 
to ensure that such a disaster did not take place in Northern Ireland.56 
 
Tactically, the focus of civil power operations had its roots in the idea of 
minimum force, a prominent concept in British accounts of counterinsurgency 
and colonial warfare. Simply, this was the principle that force should be used ‘to 
the minimum level possible’ in scenarios of population-centric warfare.57 
Supported by a number of scholars including Thomas Mockaitis and Rod 
Thornton these views have been subject to considerable revision by more 
contemporary scholars including David French and Huw Bennett.58 However, in 
the 1970s there can be little doubt that minimising dramatic wounding by 
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avoiding the use of high-powered rifles heavily influenced doctrinal and 
technical discussions. Indeed in one 1970 working paper on tactical doctrine for 
Northern Ireland, the phrase ‘minimum force’ appeared no fewer than five 
times.59  
 
Crucially, there was also awareness at the Royal Small Arms Factory that the 
Army’s equipment needed to fall in line with the tactical principle of minimising 
casualties. One MOD working paper stated that British equipment was needed 
that would allow commanders to ‘produce a graduated response and to ensure 
better protection for troops’ while soldiers were ‘in the full glare of publicity and 
detailed press comment and within the bounds of very tight political 
restrictions’.60 Among other requirements, this led to a demand for a ‘non-
injurious chemical incapacitant’ designed for dealing with crowds.61 It eventually 
led Enfield to develop the ARWEN 37mm less than-lethal anti-riot weapon that 
fired baton or tear gas rounds. 
 
The piece of equipment identified as possibly the biggest problem, however, was 
the most important to any armed force: its service rifle. At this point, the British 
Army had been using the 7.62mm SLR for nearly twenty years, and in light of the 
minimum force requirements of ‘operations in support of civil power’, its range 
and lethality all came under scrutiny. In 1974, a study was carried out that 
demonstrated the wounding capability of 7.62mm ammunition on sheep 
cadavers. This showed that in a variety of scenarios, the wounding potential of 
the ammunition was judged to be well beyond the military requirement of the 
British Army.62 Uniquely, the 7.62mm round perforated the target having passed 
through a 3.4mm steel plate at ranges of both 300m and 500m and caused 
significantly larger exit wounds in lateral-medial strikes at 300m. Further 
analysis during the 1970s found that ‘the SLR lacks the degree of selectivity 
necessary to ensure that only the person at which it is aimed will be damaged 
(e.g. the 7.62mm round will pass right through a man a short ranges)’ and that 
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‘the ideal is a round with the same accuracy as afforded by the rifle but which 
does not penetrate nor make a wound of dreadful appearance’.63 
 
Evidence of the rifle’s performance in-theatre during this period seems to 
vindicate these concerns. Chapter 3 of the Saville Report, which recounted the 
events surrounding the wounding of 28 civil rights protesters on Bloody Sunday 
in 1972 (exactly the kind of operational scenario described by the tactical 
working groups two years earlier), listed a number of examples of the 7.62mm’s 
fatal lack of precision. Of the victims, Patrick McDaid and Pius McCarron were 
injured by flying debris from shots fired, Michael Kelly was shot through a rubble 
barricade, the same shot both killed William McKinney and wounded Joe Mahon, 
and another shot killed both Gerard McKinney and Gerald Donaghey.64 
 
This pattern of thought undoubtedly guided the shift in British opinion towards 
smaller calibres during the 1970s. From a point at which the additional range 
and lethality of 7.62mm was seen as a significant asset, the UK moved to 
favouring the 4.85mm round. In the media-centred conflict environment of 
Northern Ireland, a rapid move away from the full-power cartridge was 
essential. Using a conventional cartridge casing, the British 4.85mm round was 
less experimental than the West German 4.7mm caseless ammunition. However, 
the tactical advantages that might be accrued from this lighter type of round 
might not justify NATO switching over to it. In all, therefore, the British approach 
to NATO small arms RSI was shaped by a socio-technical backdrop no less 
intricate than that of the Americans. The increasing involvement of British forces 
in a ‘civil power’ operation in Northern Ireland, in particular, shaped priorities 
on range and lethality away from the US position.  
 
 
The Evolution of the Socio-Technical Network 
While the differences between these sets of socially constructed ‘national 
military requirements’ were significant, what created an initial impasse at the 
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NATO trials in 1979-80 was how these requirements enframed the evolution of 
the small arms RSI debate. In the US, technical preferences had been inextricably 
linked to military identity from the outset. As NATO trials started, however, the 
debate over small arms RSI had become increasingly overshadowed by each 
country’s wish not just for standardisation to serve its own doctrinal 
requirements, but to achieve consensus around a small arms system of its own 
making. NATO’s major powers began to conceive of RSI as a zero-sum game, in 
which opposition to small arms systems produced by other powers became 
arguably the most embedded preference of the overarching socio-technical 
network. Indeed, this was a historic process that began almost with the 
formation of the alliance and went far beyond the heterogeneity in national 
military requirements discussed earlier in this paper. In this socio-technical 
network, historic animosities relating to prior humiliations and economic 
imperatives were layered in between these differences in national military 
requirements and made the achievement of a consensus all but impossible. 
 
While Britain eventually abandoned the EM2 in favour of the 7.62 cartridge in 
the early 1950s, the indignation in the British small arms community continued 
to overshadow decision-making on RSI issues for decades. Woodrow Wyatt 
accused Churchill of ‘selling out legitimate British interests in an effort to placate 
the Americans’65 in a Parliamentary debate in 1954. Twenty-two years (in a 
discussion of the 1976 MOU), Lord Shinwell continued to bemoan the unjustified 
decision to discard ‘what was regarded as the most efficient rifle to date’.66 
Edward Ezell wrote in 1984 that the sentiment that filled Woodrow Wyatt’s 
impassioned speech in Parliament ‘expressed the fear of many Britons: the loss 
of national identity’, and that ‘an essential element of the soldier’s esprit de corps 
was the national origin of the weapon’.67 Just like the US, where the commitment 
to larger cartridges had always been linked to ‘national, institutional and 
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personal biases’, Britain’s small arms community was increasingly against the 
adoption of small arms technology developed overseas.68 
 
One important aspect of the network was the national economic imperatives that 
underpinned all RSI in NATO, whether related to small arms systems or not. 
While more efficient defence production was frequently cited as a benefit of RSI, 
the need to serve British, West German and US military requirements also 
implied commitments to their own industrial small arms communities. The 
United States, the pre-eminent defence producer in the alliance, saw this a 
violation of the free enterprise process, but European states consistently 
asserted that a productive European armaments industry was a prerequisite ‘if 
we are to mobilise NATO’s enormous technological and industrial strength for 
our common defense’.69 There was a substantial degree of institutional jockeying 
over the ‘two-way street’; Carl Damm, a CDU member of the Bundestag, argued in 
1978 that NATO should keep five-year balance-of-payments records of who 
bought what from whom, which could then be evened out over the following five 
years.70  
 
Where the sums of money surrounding small arms were always less than for 
high-technology materiel, the downsizing or removal of original design and 
manufacturing capability was often the point of contention. In the UK, for 
example, one knock-on effect of the decision to adopt the Belgian-designed L1A1 
rifle was the move in 1959 to relegate RSAF Enfield (the premier publicly-owned 
small arms design facility) to what some officers called a ‘post-design role’71. 
Moreover, lamentation over this change endured in British thinking on small 
arms RSI; one briefing paper in 1968 stated that ‘the present small arms 
procurement policy has disadvantages which may not have been apparent when 
original design work at Enfield was stopped’72. It argued that it not only meant 
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that the UK could not adopt weapons based on its own national requirements, 
but also that it could not take advantage of the ‘expanding world market in small 
arms’.73 By 1967, it was clear that Enfield was not ‘economically viable’74 and 
was only being kept open in the hope that it would one day return to original 
research and development. The US, likewise, had long viewed RSI initiatives as a 
cover for the ‘establishment and growth of a vigorous European defence 
industrial base’75. In a publication from 1979, the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies argued that ‘we Americans still see ourselves as the great 
Arsenal of Democracy. We prefer to go it alone, to meet any challenge, and so 
forth. We conduct our national defense debate in terms of ‘Who is Number One – 
the Soviet Union, or the United States?’76 
 
The picture of the socio-technical network of small arms RSI in the late 1970s 
was therefore a complicated one. Each of NATO’s major defence producers had 
individual (socio-technical) national military requirements for a new small arms 
system, but crucially, the network had also become polarised by both the legacies 
of prior policy decisions and the broader economic context of RSI in NATO. There 
can be no doubting the strength of the animosity between the US and British 
arms establishments, in particular; one 1969 report merely presented the British 
line on the prospect of establishing 5.56mm as the NATO calibre as ‘negative… 
one of opposition’, without offering any explanation for that position.77 While, as 
Callon argues, socio-technical networks can serve as arenas for the pursuit of 
dominant interests or technical perspectives, it is clear that they can also be 
characterised by (intractable) conflict between different actors, where 
embedded preferences and prejudices culminate in impasse. 
 
Indeed, in the case of small arms RSI in NATO, such an impasse allowed an 
entirely different kind of actor, Fabrique Nationale, to achieve a degree of 
consensus around a new cartridge, the SS109. Uniquely in its capacity as a 
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commercial actor, FN was able to propose an ammunition compromise without 
the baggage of imposing a foreign small arms system on alliance powers. This 
was not achieved via the formation of an entirely new network, but the 
achievement of a new compromise within the old one. In 1979, when all three of 
the NATO big powers proposed their own ammunition and weapon for trials in 
Hammelburg, West Germany, Fabrique Nationale’s main small arms objective 
was to find a way to sell the FN Minimi to the US Army. A light machine gun, 
however, was not a requirement for the West Germans, who remained 
committed to heavier sustained fire belt-fed weapons like the 7.62mm MG3. 
Unlike the British Armed Forces, furthermore, the Bundeswehr’s rifle was 
serviceable for ‘at least another ten years’78; consequently, the West Germans 
were willing to allow other NATO powers to use 5.56mm ammunition but were 
unwilling to adopt it themselves given their ambitions for the G11. Thus, FN 
ultimately produced a cartridge that was simultaneously able to negotiate each 
actor’s long-held prejudices. It could buy the support of those European powers 
that wanted a two-way street in R&D, manufacturing and procurement, while 
both the US and UK were able to use the SS109 in their own small arms systems. 
 
Ultimately, FN took advantage of the different challenges facing the big three 
powers to redefine the problem in less ambitious terms but in ways that all the 
powers could accept. West Germany accepted 5.56mm as a standard but refused 
to adopt the ammunition for service. Britain on the other hand dropped its own 
round in favour of 5.56mm ammunition even though on the face of it, it was 
considered to be highly lethal and unsuitable for operations in Northern Ireland. 
The Americans found themselves having to select FN’s version of 5.56mm 
ammunition so as to avoid the embarrassment of using a standard that no other 
NATO power would accept. All three powers ended up selecting something that 
they would not have initially chosen but which was nonetheless acceptable to the 
Alliance as a whole. 
 
 
Conclusion 
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Compared to those literatures that draw on IR theory or political economy, this 
article has taken an approach that analyses the way that technology change is 
emblematic of the cultural processes from which they emerge. By drawing on 
Actor Network Theory it becomes evident that the relationship between 
technology and its developers is mutually constitutive. Referring to technology 
and the groups that push it forward as equal ‘social actants’, the arguments 
advanced here reflect Bruno Latour’s assertion that technology reinforces and 
demonstrates identity.79 During the Cold War, technological choices reflected 
embedded socio-technical preferences on range and lethality that were as much 
about evolving relational structures surrounding identity and status as they 
were related to nations’ individual utility calculations. 
 
Thus, the Americans were worried about replacing the M16 with a European 
weapon because it would suggest that the decision to get rid of the M-14 was 
misplaced. The British remained hamstrung by being forced to abandon their 
EM2 weapon and adopt American standards. Of the three it was the West 
Germans who most clearly focused on the utility benefits that might come from 
switching to the G11. Nevertheless, the net result was that all three states were 
very reluctant to adopt weapons designed and built overseas and had to find 
ways to justify choices that balanced identity against Alliance effectiveness. 
Consequently, the main priority of the FRG was developing a rifle that would give 
infantry a flexible mechanised capability in a conventional war against the Soviet 
Union. By contrast British thinking was far more conditioned by the knock-on 
effect from the adoption of the SLR and the intensifying conflict in Northern 
Ireland. The Americans, meanwhile, still held on to the lethality myth they had 
constructed in order to justify the replacement of the M-14 in favour of the M16. 
FN’s success lay in the recognition that NATO’s ambition for standardisation had 
consistently failed when framed in terms of grand strategy. As a commercial 
actor providing something of a compromise, FN was able to duck the deeper 
political challenges associated with standardisation.  
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This case study thus reveals the extent to which national defence priorities 
deviated from those of NATO during the Cold War. Although the NATO-USSR 
divide dominated foreign policy discourse in this period, the debates 
surrounding small arms standardisation make it clear that there was far more 
going on in the minds of NATO member states than bipolarity-centred historical 
accounts would have us believe. Only the FRG’s strategic agenda was 
synonymous with that of the collective; the attitudes of the British and 
Americans to defence matters were clearly conditioned by their participation in 
other conflicts, their national biases, and even their economic interests. In this 
way, the sociology of small arms development may be indicative of the 
incoherence and volatility of collective strategic thinking generally, and of the 
vast networks of countervailing interests on which it is based. 
